Transit and peering arrangements among Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) are essential for the global delivery of communication services on the Internet. In addition, to support delay sensitive applications (e.g., streaming and multimedia applications) it is important for IBPs to maintain high service quality even if the network is congested. One promising approach is to establish interconnection agreements among providers to dynamically trade network capacity. To make such interconnections possible in a competitive setting, we propose a pricing scheme that considers factors such as network utilization, link capacity, and the cost structure of the interconnecting participants. Our analyses show that the common SKA (Sender Keeps All) mode of settlement does not provide adequate incentives for collaboration; rather, the provider that delivers the packets should be suitably compensated at an equilibrium price. Two price equilibria are identified: the first favors slower IBPs whereas the other is congestion-based and can be more beneficial for faster IBPs. When cost asymmetries exist, the lower cost IBP needs to offer a price discount to induce participation. We show that a usage-based, utilization-adjusted interconnection agreement could align the costs and revenues of the providers while allowing them to meet more stringent QoS requirements.
Introduction
The Internet is a global, complex, yet loosely organized collection of data networks running on the TCP/IP protocol family. A communication session on the Internet could traverse through network segments owned by several competing service providers. Thus, collaboration among providers is needed for the end-to-end delivery of network services.
A network operator can be of two categories: Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Internet Backbone Provider (IBP). ISPs offer retail network access for individuals and institutions, while IBPs provide high-speed, long haul communication links for ISPs. These categories can overlap:
an ISP may sometimes operate wide area links and an IBP may serve retail clients; however, the overall structure of the Internet is generally considered to be hierarchical in nature.
Of the three possible modes of interconnection among providers (between ISPs, between an ISP and IBP, and between IBPs), the focus of this paper is on interconnection arrangements between IBPs. Since the commercialization of the Internet, several network access points (NAPs) and Metropolitan Access Exchanges (MAEs) have been set up for IBPs to exchange (or peer) traffic with one another. At public exchanges, current interconnection arrangements are relatively simple: predominantly the originator of the traffic pays no fee to the recipient; thus the name: "Sender Keeps All" (SKA). Free swapping of traffic worked well when traffic flows were light and nearly symmetrical (Frieden 1998) ; the low network utilization allowed providers to accommodate peered traffic with little incremental congestion. Furthermore, traffic symmetry implied near-zero net volume between providers, making sophisticated network monitoring and accounting (for billing purposes) unnecessary.
With the emergence of delay sensitive services (such as streaming media, VoIP, and Virtual Private Network provision) however, barter arrangements such as SKA have become inadequate, exposing peering participants to the opportunistic behavior of their partners. For example, source routing (Steenstrup 1995) and shortest exit routing (Jew and Nicholls 1999 , Cukier 1998 , Frieden 1998 ) allow offloading patterns of network traffic that lead to suboptimal network utilization, data loss, and delay. Another serious consequence is that there is little incentive for infrastructure expansion -a carrier willing to expand capacity has no way of preventing further exploitation by others. To alleviate or even solve this problem, paid peering seems to a natural choice.
In an attempt to recoup their investments, many established backbone providers have opted to remove their presence at public NAPs and instead negotiate interconnection arrangements at private exchange points (for example, see Lambert (1997) for Sprint's and UUnet's decisions).
While the exact terms have not been made public, private interconnection agreements are currently based on several technical and operating criteria, such as: network capacity, geographic coverage, number and dispersion of interconnection points, volume of traffic exchanged, traffic flow symmetry, and network management capability (for example, see stated criteria by WorldCom (2001) and Level 3 (2002) ). Bilateral relationships at private exchanges range from settlement-free peering agreements to transit contracts that have usage-based and congestionadjusted components. The question of how interconnection can be established in an economically optimal manner has attracted considerable interest from academia, industry, and government agencies (Giovannetti 2000 , Huston 1998 , Jew and Nicholls 1999 , ACCC 2000 .
However, while peering and transit agreements are widely used among network providers, there have been very few studies (Crèmer et al. 2000, Foros and Hansen 2001) that address the optimal design of interconnection contracts at the Internet backbone level using network engineering parameters.
As indicated earlier, an obvious benefit of interconnecting backbone networks is that "serial" interconnection enables the global delivery of communication services even when no single network is omnipresent. Another benefit -the focus of the present study -is that "parallel" interconnection that allows providers to guarantee better quality of service (QoS) through dynamic route selection among several possible routes. The intuition here is that interconnection could help reduce network delays or packet loss by diverting traffic to alternative network paths when the primary one is under heavy load. However, to achieve capacity sharing in a competitive market requires carefully designed pricing mechanisms, as simple barter agreements do not provide adequate incentives for such collaboration.
The major contributions of this research are:
1. We evaluate the performance of three operating modes among IBPs: independent, centrally managed, and interconnected. The analysis demonstrates the extent of improvement in network performance that can be achieved through interconnection. We also show that, without adequate compensation, competing IBPs do not share capacity with one another.
2. We next propose a usage-based interconnection arrangement and derive the interconnection price that an IBP should offer its peering partner for packet delivery. We also analyze the circumstances under which an IBP should agree to deliver an interconnected packet. Using queuing and game theoretic analyses, we find that an IBP should agree to serve a partner's packet only if the payment it receives covers or exceeds the cost of losing its own packet while the other network's packet is being delivered. Two price equilibria are identified. In the first equilibrium, the receiving IBP extracts the entire surplus (which is in direct contrast to SKA). This equilibrium awards the slower IBP a larger proportion of the surplus generated from interconnection. The second price equilibrium specifies a congestion-adjusted price that awards a greater share of the surplus to the IBP with higher network capacity.
3. We also examine how the above price equilibria shift under cost asymmetry. An IBP that charges a lower price to its customers (e.g., by offering a lower QoS guarantee) also needs to offer its services (to the other IBP) at a price discount so as to induce participation. We derive a threshold discount rate below which a low-cost IBP may be better off without interconnection.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize related work on the technical, economic, and political aspects of Internet interconnection. In Section 3 we apply queuing theory to assess the network QoS under different interconnection decisions. Section 4 incorporates the results from Section 3 and identifies the optimal pricing scheme and the interconnection decision. In Section 5 we consider the effect of cost asymmetries among IBPs.
Section 6 discusses research implications and possible extensions while Section 7 concludes and summarizes the paper.
Related Work
In this section, we summarize the literature on Internet interconnection. We first cover technical advancements on Internet routing efficiency and then review work on Internet peering and transit agreements from economic and political perspectives.
Technical Aspects
Improving routing efficiency in large-scale communication networks in general (Ball et al. 1995 , Steenstrup 1995 and in the Internet in particular (Huitema 1995 , Halibi 2000 is a well-studied area. The research on network routing includes algorithmic route selection (Halibi 2000) and methods to exchange routing information in the network (Chinoy 1993) . Savage et al. (1999) have identified several limitations in Internet routing and proposed "informed" routing mechanisms. Transmission delays can also be reduced by shortening the distance of transmission by caching popular content at proxy servers and surrogate servers situated at key locations in network (Kwan et al. 1995 , Hatlestad 2000 . However, with caching, synchronizing distributed cache contents becomes an issue (Jarke et al. 2000, Chaudhuri and Dayal 1997) and this approach is less applicable if the content being demanded changes rapidly.
In general, technical solutions alone are not sufficient to optimize performance. In the absence of appropriate incentives, providers may not select the "optimal" route to deliver packets. Hence, in addition to technical considerations, economic incentives are needed to improve performance.
Economic and Regulatory Considerations
Since the Internet heavily relies on interconnection for the delivery of global communications, the economics of network interconnection have received considerable attention (Ferguson and Huston 1998 , Huston 1999 , ACCC 2000 , Srinagesh 1996 , Bailey 1997 . Depending on the settlement (i.e., payment) structure, network interconnection is traditionally described either by a peering agreement between ISPs or between IBPs, or by a transit agreement in which an ISP is regarded as a customer of an IBP. Our interest is to analyze interconnection between IBPs (Crèmer et al. 2000, Weiss and Shin 2004) , with a special focus on how such interconnection affects the overall QoS of the network.
There have been several studies that focus on the interconnection among ISPs (Baake and Wichmann 1999, Jew and Nicholls 1999) . These proposals include models that consider the value of the subscription base as well as the externality generated from interconnection. For example, Baake and Wichmann (1999) assume that two ISPs could engage in Cournot competition by choosing the capacity of the interconnection link so as to maximize revenue. Giovannetti (2000) found that interconnection creates surplus in situations where there is sufficient differentiation (e.g., with respect to the content hosted) between the markets served by the different ISPs. Foros and Hansen (2001) use game theory to derive the capacity of a shared connecting link at a private exchange for ISPs.
The interconnection at the Internet backbone, on the other hand, has drawn less attention. A notable exception is the study by Crèmer et al. (2000) that provides an excellent summary on the technical and economic structure of the Internet backbone. It also analyzes the possibility for a dominant IBP to intentionally degrade link quality when connecting with a "targeted" group of smaller providers. An important issue that has not been addressed in the existing literature is the pricing of backbone interconnection. While there have been numerous studies on congestionbased network pricing (for example, see Gupta et al. 1999, Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004) , the focus has been mainly on pricing issues between providers and subscribers rather than among backbone peers. Thus the results of many network pricing studies do not directly apply here.
While SKA (Frieden 1998 ) is simple to implement and facilitates universal backbone access (high cost providers are implicitly subsidized), it permits free riding and is considered a suboptimal interconnection arrangement at the backbone level (Laffont et al. 2003) . The inadequacy of existing interconnection mechanisms is further exemplified by the difficulties faced by a former network provider (Exodus Communications -now part of Cable & Wireless) to gain backbone access (Cook 1998 , InternetNews 2000 .
From an international perspective, a variety of proposals have called for governmental intervention (Cukier 1998 , Frieden 1998 , Roehrich and Armstrong 2000 , Cave and Mason 2001 with the goal of ensuring open, fair, and ubiquitous interconnection. Foreign providers, because they perceive to bear a disproportionate share of the interconnection cost, have voiced the need for regulatory action against their U.S. counterparts (Roehrich and Armstrong 2000, ACCC 2000) . Currently, Internet services remain exempt from the regulations imposed on the utility and telecommunication sectors (Kende 2000) .
To the best of our knowledge, the current study is among the first of its kind that jointly investigates how operational and economic factors (e.g., network link speed, network congestion and interconnection price) could play an important role in the successful establishment of backbone level network interconnection. Our aim is to suggest a market mechanism that retains the dynamic aspects of the Internet and relies on technical and economic means rather than on regulatory intervention. We formalize our analysis next.
Interconnection without Pricing
In this section, we show how interconnection decisions could affect the individual and overall network QoS. Here, we use "parallel queues," a well-known area in queuing theory, to model the interconnection between competing backbone providers serving the same geographical region.
Parallel queues have been extensively studied, dating back to the 1950's (Haight 1958) . Koenigsberg (1966) studied jockeying in parallel queues; a situation similar to the interconnection problem studied here.
Consider two IBP's (IBP-1 and IBP-2) with demand arrival rates of λ 1 and λ 2 and link transmission speeds (i.e. service rates) of µ 1 and µ 2 . We consider parallel M/M/1/1 queues where both the arrival and departure processes are Poisson, and this applies at the level of network nodes where the routing decisions are made. If interconnected, a packet arriving at a busy IBP's node can be redirected to the other IBP. Note, however, that the second IBP may decline to serve a redirected packet.
In this paper, we assume bufferless queues. Under this assumption there is no need to analyze the system for queuing delays; rather, the key metric is the rate of packet loss. The assumption of bufferless queues can be justified as follows. First, the interconnection studied here arises mainly when there are time constraints on packet delivery. Without time constraints, packets can in be indefinitely stored in a buffer, and provided that the service rate is greater than the arrival rate, the stored packets will eventually be delivered. However, with time constraints imposed on delivery, buffer sizes need to be kept small and can be reasonably approximated by bufferless queues. Bufferless networks are common in optical networks that use "hot-potato" routing (Duato 1996 ).
We next analyze three possible modes of operation between two parallel networks: independent, centrally managed, and fee-paying interconnection.
Two Independent IBPs
In steady state, the probability that there are j packets in IBP-k's system,
where the superscript k = 1, 2 are indices for the IBPs. The subscript j depicts the status of the network: j = 0 for an idle network link and j = 1 for a busy one. For this particular setting, 
Centralized IBPs
We now show how centralized operation can reduce the loss ratio for both providers. The intuition for this lies in the fact that when a packet arrives at a busy network, the other network, if idle, can assume the delivery. The centralized case extracts the maximum benefit possible from interconnection.
Denote the state probabilities for centralized operation as , and assigns each arrival to a specific IBP. The loss ratio associated with centralized operation is described in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. The loss ratio for centralized operation is
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix, where the proofs for all the propositions, lemmas, and corollaries can be found. When both IBPs are idle, it can be shown that a new arrival should be routed to the network with the higher service rate. The above corollary asserts that centralized operations will always lead to better overall QoS, as measured by the loss ratio. However, this does not imply that both IBPs will be better off. In fact, a large provider with low network utilization will be worse off (will experience a higher loss ratio) if it is co-managed with a slower but busier one. Therefore, while such sharing of capacity is desirable, it may not be a natural outcome in a competitive market.
When the IBPs have the same utilization (ρ), the loss ratio in Proposition 1 can be reduced to, 
where S is the ratio of the link speeds, namely,
The loss ratio in (2) is typically smaller than that for the independent case shown in (1) (except for ρ = 0 or 1, or S → ∞; when they are equal). It is worth noting that the benefits from centralized operation, i.e., the difference between (2) and (1), decreases if both IBPs become busier (higher ρ). We also note that
, implying that the benefit increases (i.e. c Q 11 decreases) with S but starts to diminish once the derivative becomes positive, i.e., when
. The intuition is that the slower provider's contribution is marginalized once S increases beyond the above threshold.
Interconnected IBPs
Now consider a situation when the two IBPs operate separately, but when an IBP is busy it offers to pay the other IBP to deliver its packets. The receiving IBP can, in turn, decide to accept or reject such requests. An idle IBP would choose to reject a routed packet (and forgo the payment)
if it is not sufficiently compensated for the risk of losing its own packets. Assume that each IBP accepts a competitor's packet with probability q k , k = 1, 2. The state probabilities,
1, are solved and explicitly expressed in the proof of the following proposition. The proposition considers a situation when the two IBPs always agree to deliver each others' packets.
PROPOSITION 2. The loss ratio for interconnected IBPs, when
Corollary 2 below compares the three modes of operation.
COROLLARY 2. The following inequality holds,
It is clear that interconnection improves the performance of both IBPs, from the case where the two providers operate independently. However, as expected, interconnected performance is strictly dominated (in most cases) by centralized operation. To compare the loss ratio, we restrict ourselves to the case where both IBPs have the same utilization. The loss ratio is, 
The benefit of interconnection over the independent case is the difference between (3) and (1).
This difference diminishes when IBP-1 dominates because
. Compared with centralized operation, the loss ratio in (3) is higher than in (2), except for ρ = 0 or 1, or, S = 1 or S → ∞, when they are identical.
In Table 1 , we show the sign of first derivative of 2 1 j j Q with respect to the routing decision variables q 1 and q 2 . The explicit expressions for these derivatives can be found in the proof of 
, for IBP-1; and similarly,
COROLLARY 3. The loss ratio for IBP-i satisfies the following inequalities,
where, j ≠ i.
Intuitively speaking, accepting packets from a peering partner with a higher probability increases the risk that one's own packets get dropped. This suggests a trade-off between the extra revenue from delivering routed packets and maintaining service quality for one's own customers.
We will analyze this tradeoff further in the next section.
It is important to note that the point
is not an equilibrium. However, if this routing strategy were somehow mandated, both providers will be able to increase QoS. Although such enforcement is difficult to visualize in a commercial setting, it may be considered as a welfare policy choice for public exchanges. In the next section, we discuss how participation in peering arrangement could occur (i.e., is an equilibrium) in the presence of a pricing scheme.
Without pricing, the IBPs will likely opt out of peering -a suboptimal outcome similar to the one that occurs in a prisoner's dilemma game. This outcome (i.e., prisoner's dilemma) occurs under the usual assumptions of self interested participants. If the participants consider global as opposed to myopic implications of their actions, then other (superior) outcomes may be realized.
Routing and Pricing Strategies
In this section, we jointly analyze the two elements of the interconnection decision: the routing probabilities (i.e., q 1 and q 2 ) and the interconnection prices (denoted by p 1 and p 2 ). The temporal structure for the two-stage game is as follows. First, both IBPs simultaneously decide on the interconnection fees; second, they simultaneously choose their interconnection strategies. As a standard procedure, we use backward induction to identify the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Routing Equilibrium
Without loss of generality, we assume that each IBP charges its customers a unit price for each packet. Also, the other IBP is charged a transfer fee of p 1 (p 2 ) by IBP-1 (IBP-2) for each routed packet. It is expected that 1 , 2 1 ≤ p p . More precisely, we define a set for transfer prices,
The profit function is,
for IBP-1, and similarly,
for IBP-2. Each profit expression above contains three terms; the first is the profit from serving an IBP's own customers, the second is the profit from serving packets coming from the other provider, and the third the profit that comes from one's own customers that were serviced by the other IBP. The objective is to maximize π i by choosing q i .
PROPOSITION 3. IBP-i's best routing response function, to IBP-j's decision q j , is
where, 
Interconnection Strategies in Price Domain
Next we examine how prices would influence the routing decision. It is straightforward to observe from (7) that the threshold * j θ decreases with p i and becomes negative if,
This indicates that IBP-i will always participate in interconnection if it can charge a price above
, regardless of IBP-j's strategy (i.e., the value of q j ). The threshold ρ i is simply i Q 1 , the value of the loss ratio in the situation where the two IBPs operate independently.
Intuitively, a provider would choose to interconnect if the profit from servicing packets from the peering partner more than compensates the loss from dropping one's own packets.
From (7) it is also clear that the value of * j θ increases with p j . When 
where the slope is
and the intercept (the value of p i when p j = 0) is
It is clear from (10) that ϕ i > 0 and from (9) that p j = 1 when p i = ρ i .
FIGURE 2. Equilibrium routing probabilities at different prices To graphically illustrate the dependence of the routing probabilities on prices, we plot (8) (with an equality sign) and (9) in Figure 2 . There are four lines that divide Ω into 9 regions. We first focus on the following 3 regions, defined as,
These three regions are indicated in Figure 2 . In these regions, the value of * 2 θ varies from 0 to 1. We introduce two lemmas. LEMMA 1. The equilibrium routing probabilities are , and given the dominant strategy in 2 ∆ , the optimal equilibrium interconnection strategy is
(1, 0),
(1, 1),
,
where the four regions are defined as,
PROOF. Proposition 4 follows Lemmas 1 and 2 directly.
Price Equilibrium
In the previous section, we have identified four regions in
and showed that each region has an optimal equilibrium interconnection strategy. These four regions are plotted in (1, 0)
FIGURE 3. Price response functions
As usual, we start with the derivation of the best price response functions. Recall that the profit functions, given by (4) and (5), depend linearly on the prices; therefore, it is expected that the best responses would lie on some boundaries of the above four regions. This is indeed the case, as formally stated in Proposition 5, which can be proved with the help of Lemmas 3 and 4.
The results in these two lemmas help to show that some parts of the boundaries of Region-(1, 1)
in Figure 3 give the best responses. With a more detailed notation for IBP-i's profit function, If IBP-i's price is 1 and IBP-j charges at its utilization level, IBP-i will always be better off (have a higher profit) if IBP-j accepts routed packets with probability 1. In Figure 3 , the first inequality is shown to hold at Point-X 1 (marked as a hollow triangle).
LEMMA 4. The following inequality holds for IBP-i,
where,
for . Figure 3 , where part of (12) The price response functions are plotted in Figure 3 , where the thick solid (dashed) line represents the IBP-1 (IBP-2)'s best price response to the price offered by IBP-2 (IBP-1). If IBP-2's price p 2 is above a threshold value η 2 , IBP-1 has to charge a lower price (than 1) to induce IBP-2's participation in interconnection. The locations where the two best price response curves cross yield the equilibrium prices, as described in Proposition 6. 
An example for IBP-i is shown in
under the condition that
and that
The Nash equilibrium ) 1 , 1 ( ) , ( It is worth noting that the κ-equilibrium is unstable (Tirole 1988) . Two IBPs can start from any initial pair of prices, and sequentially adjust their respect prices according to the response functions depicted in Figure 3 . This process of price adjustment will converge to (p 1 * , p 2 * ) = (1, 1), the stable equilibrium point. Of course, this definition of stability is under the assumption that both IBPs are myopic with respect to the time horizon they use for profit maximization.
Congestion Based κ-equilibrium
We first numerically investigate the regions where the congestion-based κ-equilibrium exists. PROOF. Omitted.
In this case, two IBPs charge close to their utilization level when their traffic is either very light or very heavy (ρ near 0 or 1); and when ρ ≈ 0.3, κ 1 and κ 2 deviate most significantly from ρ. This non-linear behavior reflects the fact that the impact of interconnection on both IBPs is minimal when their traffic is light (small probability of routing packets) or heavy (small probability of accepting packets).
Distribution of Interconnection Surplus
In this subsection, we attempt to find out which IBP benefits more from interconnection. We first notice that, when both IBPs participate in interconnection, or, 
that is, the total profit is independent of the interconnection prices. We examine the distribution of surplus at the stable equilibrium point
Define the increase of profit over non-interconnection as,
(1,1;1,1) (0,0; )
In Figure 5a , the region above each curve indicates when IBP-1 has a smaller share of the overall surplus, or when ∆π 1 < ∆π 2 . For S = 1, the boundary is given by ρ 1 = ρ 2 . The less busy network also gets a larger share of the surplus. The region where ∆π 1 < ∆π 2 expands as S becomes larger, an indication that IBP-1 receives a diminishing proportion of the overall surplus. As shown in Figure 4b , IBP-1 does even worse if the percentage increase, / (0,0; )
On the other hand, IBP-1 can be better off at the κ-point equilibrium. For example, the middle line in Figure 4a shows the boundary, above which,
However, as S gets larger, this line approaches the upper bound of the existence region (for example, in Figure 4b ).
To conclude this section, it appears that an interconnection fee (whether full price or the amount prescribed by the congestion based κ-equilibrium) is necessary to induce interconnection in order to achieve better QoS, and hence higher profits. Another issue is the distribution of surplus. Following the full price equilibrium (1, 1), the faster IBP typically gets a smaller share of the surplus. However, in the congestion equilibrium (κ 1 , κ 2 ) the faster IBP is at a relative advantage. In the next section, we consider two providers that charge their customers different prices and see how the interconnection and pricing decisions are affected.
Interconnection between Asymmetric Providers
So far, we have assumed that both IBP's charge their customers the same price unit (normalized Due to scaling, most of the previous analyses hold with the rescaled prices. This allows us to easily redraw the optimal interconnection strategies as shown in Figure 6 .
We summarize the following effects due to asymmetric prices.
1.
c p ≤ 2 . The price that IBP-2 charges IBP-1 is bounded by c, the price that IBP-1 charges its customers; 2. Equation (9) , depicted by Line-B in Figure 6a . Equation (8) becomes ) (
; this is Line-R 2 in Figure 6a .
3. There are four equilibrium interconnection strategies: if c is above ρ 2 (Figure 6a ).
Otherwise the strategy (q 1 * , q 2 * ) = (0, 1) no longer exists (Figure 6b ).
In addition, we have the following lemma. 
where
FIGURE 6. Impact of cost asymmetry (c) on equilibrium strategies for (a) c > ρ 2 and (b) c ≤ ρ 2
In Figure 6 , the best price response functions are plotted. For IBP-2, the response function remains the same. That is, for the case of c > ρ 2 shown in Figure 6a , the best response curve is described by the line p 2 * = c, except for a segment appearing on Line-R 2 . If c ≤ ρ 2 , Figure 6b shows that the best price response function is p 2 * = c or p 2 * = R 2 (p 1 ), but only for a set of p 1 that induce interconnection strategy (q 1 * , q 2 * ) = (1, 1). Outside this region, IBP-2 sets prices arbitrarily as it no longer participates in interconnection. Figure 6 also draws the best price response function (shown as a thick line) for IBP-1.
We are now in a position to derive the price equilibrium. Here, we focus only on the stable equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 7. The price equilibrium is The region is relatively small, but it increases with the relative network size S. However, the magnitude of price discount (from a price of 1) is quite significant. More discounts will be needed if IBP-1 is faster. Also, IBP-1 gives a higher discount when its network becomes busier.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the impact of IBP-2's congestion level; when IBP-2 gets busier, the discount price that IBP-1 provides will drop. 
Discussion
We have shown how pricing contracts between interconnected IBPs can be drawn based upon quantifiable attributes such as network capacity and utilization. Currently, subscribers that demand high quality Internet connections often resort to multi-homing (Morrissey 2003) or third party routing. Alternatively, backbone providers could provide more streamlined service and better QoS using the interconnection models studied here.
Planning for network capacity is difficult: insufficient network capacity results in spotty coverage, low reliability (Paxon 1999 , Chinoy 1993 , and long delays, whereas investing blindly on infrastructure could mean huge losses (Mehta 2001) . Even though we do not specifically address the problem of capacity planning, interconnection offers greater flexibility with respect to capacity decisions, thereby reducing the cost of over and under capacity. Essentially, providers can "buy" spot capacity when the demand surges, and "sell" extra capacity in exchange for a payment during periods of low demand -a common business practice in the utility industry.
We anticipate that once usage-based pricing schemes become prevalent at the Internet backbone, more intense collaboration could take place among regional ISPs. If the payment for backbone access is proportional to the amount of data transported, regional ISPs have a high incentive to bypass the backbone for local traffic. Such cooperative use of local routes could further improve the overall network resource utilization. This view coincides with predictions that, as the industry matures small ISPs will start to form alliances (Cukier 1998) or consolidate (Jew and Nicolls 1999) .
Our analysis requires that traffic volume needs to be measured, i.e., the number of packets sent and received needs be accounted for. Since existing communication networks (such as the wireless 3G) have already implemented sophisticated network monitoring and management features, packet level accounting should not hinder the applicability of our model. Also, while our model is intended to price a "spot" interconnection fee based on real-time network conditions, it is possible to derive a more stable pricing scheme based on smoothed historical data.
Providers from different classes possess divergent views on network traffic. Front-end providers (such as retail and web hosting ISPs) favor high levels of traffic, for it indicates either the size of their customer base and/or the popularity of the content they host. Back-end providers, however, are mainly concerned the cost of carrying the traffic. This could explain why
IBPs are reluctant to peer with lower-tier providers, since under SKA the cost of the data transported by the backbone provider cannot be recouped. This also helps explain the trend that interconnection across different classes of providers have become fee-paying transit agreements.
The interaction between value-centric and cost-centric providers, however, requires further analysis and is only partially addressed by our model.
Concluding Remarks
The enormous network externalities generated by the Internet are, to a large extent, due to its open architecture that allows individual networks to easily interconnect with one another. The past decade has witnessed the transition of the Internet from a research experiment among a handful of universities to an indispensable tool in areas such as science, education, and
commerce. An integrated approach addressing the technical, economic, and political aspects of network interconnection is therefore critical to ensure the continued growth and utility of the Internet.
In this paper, we investigate interconnection arrangements at the Internet backbone with the aim to identify optimal interconnection strategies which could help IBPs improve routing decisions and service quality. Parallel M/M/1/1 queues were used to model peered networks. The model captures the QoS impact of the interconnection strategy of the partners. Results from the queuing model are examined using game theory to derive various incentive compatible peering arrangements. We also extend our analysis for asymmetric providers, i.e., the providers that charge different prices to their customers. Here, the lower priced provider offers a discount to the higher priced one so as to induce interconnection.
Several possible extensions exist on the queuing front. There could be more than two parallel queues; the QoS can be measured by not just the loss ratio but also by a composite factor consisting of queuing delay, loss ratio, and so forth (Paxson 1999 , Bolot 1993 . These extensions, however, will significantly complicate the analysis, making simulation or other numerical methods necessary. Here, we assume that when a packet arrives and both networks are idle, the central administer will assign it to IBP-1 with probability r. We can represent the transition diagram with a set of balance equations in the steady state. In the matrix form, 
Proof of Corollary 1
First, ignoring the second term in the denominator of The state transition diagram is depicted in Figure A2 . When IBP-1 is busy and IBP-2 idles, i.e., in the state (j 1 , j 2 ) = (1, 0), IBP-2 will become busy if its own packet arrives (with probability λ 2 ), or if it decides to accept a packet routed from IBP-1 (with probability λ 1 q 2 ). This leads to a state where both IBPs are busy, or (j 1 , j 2 ) = (1, 1). The rest of the transition arcs are self-explanatory.
We can again write all the balance equations in a matrix form, 
Proof of Corollary 2
The first inequality follows since ) ( 
Proof of Corollary 3
We start with the first derivatives of state probabilities, with respect to q 1 , Due to the symmetry, the first derivatives with respect to q 2 can be found by swapping the indices 1 ↔ 2 for parameters λ, µ, q, Γ; and also Q 01 ↔ Q 10 . The signs of these first derivatives are summarized in Table 1 .
It is obvious that the first inequality holds as the first derivative of both terms is positive. To prove the second inequality, we explicitly carry out the differentiation. This gives,
where the indices i and j take values of 1 and 2, but i ≠ j. The above expression is strictly negative since 1 ≤ j q .
Proof of Proposition 3
The first derivative of IBP-i's profit function, with respect to its interconnection decision q i , is
where i ≠ j. Notice that the right hand side of (A1) is independent of q i , suggesting extreme-point solutions that depend on the routing fees as well as the interconnection strategy of IBP-j, q j .
Proposition 3 follows an examination to the sign of (A1) -* j θ is the value of q j when (A1) becomes zero.
Proof of Lemma 2
To identify the dominant strategy in the Region-∆ 2 , the profits for a given price pair (p 1 , p 2 ), are, 
Proof of Lemma 3
We explicitly calculate, Therefore, when q 2 is changed from 0 to 1, π 1 increases.
Proof of Lemma 4
From (12), we find that The proof for IBP-2 is similar.
Proof of Proposition 5
We first notice that, within each of the four regions defined in Proposition 4 and drawn in Figure   3 , i.e., 
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6 follows Proposition 5 directly. Equations (14) and (15) 
Proof of Lemma 5
For a given c, we solve ( ) From the proof of Lemma 3, we know the denominator in the above two expressions is positive.
It can be verified, by substituting in the explicit expressions of state probabilities, that the numerator of η 21 is positive.
Proof of Proposition 7
The equilibrium prices are straightforward following the best price response functions, depicted in Figure 6 . Lemma 5 states that η 2 increases as c is reduced. The threshold value c L can be found by setting η 2 to c.
